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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether the availability of consumer loans has a 
positive or negative effect on the indicators of financial well being for consumers in 
the same area.  By observing the number of consumer lending establishments and 
regressing those numbers on financial indicators, such as percent in poverty and 
median household income, this paper observes any statistically significant 
correlations that arise out of the presence of these establishments as well as the sign 
(positive or negative) of the correlation.  The data period is 2007 to 2013.  This 
process is used for nationwide numbers as well as six selected Southern states.  For 
those states, current laws and regulations are reviewed to determine if state law can 
have any effect on the availability of this type of credit.  Results show a limited 
number of statistically significant relationships in the years after the 2008-2009 
financial crisis.  The financial well-being variables are percent in poverty, median 
household income, and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings.  The results indicate some 
positive and some negative correlations between establishments and the financial 
indicators.  The lack of statistical significance in these regressions indicates that 
there must be some correlations in the U.S. that differ fundamentally from the 
southern states studied, a topic worthy of future study.  
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I. Introduction 
Consumer lending is viewed by some as detrimental to the financial well-
being of the borrowers.  These borrowers often have low or no credit and pay the 
highest possible interest rate, and if their financial situation worsens and they are 
unable to repay the loan, they could be burdened with a defaulted loan, debt 
collection, garnishment or seizure of property.  On the other hand, a consumer loan 
given to a high-risk borrower could be a necessary credit option that keeps the 
borrower in a position to continue meeting their basic financial needs, e.g. fixing 
their vehicle so they can travel to work, paying large bills on time, etc.  Due to the 
consumer’s poor credit score, consumer loans could be the only option he or she has 
for credit.  The question addressed in this study is which of these scenarios is more 
likely.  Of course, different states in the U.S. have different proportions of high risk 
consumers as well as different lending laws, so different states might offer different 
answers.  
This study focuses on the consumer lending that consists of all credit offered 
by consumer lending establishments.  The North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) defines consumer lending establishments as those.  Illustrative 
examples include finance companies, personal credit institutions, small loan 
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companies and student loan companies.1  These establishments are 
considered nondepository credit intermediaries because they offer credit to 
consumers but do not accept deposits, unlike banks and credit unions.  The NAICS 
definition of consumer lending does not include credit card issuing, sales financing 
or other secondary market financing. 
The central question in mind for this project is: How does access to high risk 
credit affect consumer financial well-being?  Access is measured by the number of 
consumer lending establishments present within a state or county.  This study 
focuses on consumer loans, not business loans.  The financial indicators used here 
are intended to measure the financial well-being in a county or state.  The statistical 
analysis in this study attempts to quantify the effect that access to high risk credit 
has on consumer well-being.  Assuming that access to these loans is necessary for 
consumers to fulfill immediate financial needs, consumers should be less likely to 
file bankruptcy if they have access to high risk credit.  They would also be less likely 
lose their job or drop below the poverty line.  On the other hand, the additional debt 
obligation may make them more likely to default on their loans, increasing their 
debt per capita, lowering credit scores and making it more difficult to acquire a loan 
in the future.  This study attempts to provide insight into which of these contrary 
effects is more likely. 
Two factors are hypothesized to affect access to high risk credit.  The first is 
state lending laws.  The presence of an establishment represents a tolerance on the 
part of a state government to allow an establishment to exist and operate.  
                                                        
1 U.S. Census Bureau. (2013, May 13). North American Industry Classification 
System.  
3 
 
Establishments that rely on high risk, high interest loans are presumed to be less 
prevalent in states that do not permit loans with high interest rates.  Consumer 
lending is regulated primarily by states.  States determine their own interest rate 
maximum, permissible fees and recourses for recovery of bad debt.  These state-
imposed limits on consumer lending are important when determining what positive 
or negative effects such lending has on consumers. 
The second factor affecting the number of establishments is the demand of 
the surrounding population.  Low income communities have consumers with lower 
credit scores whose sole option for credit is high interest loans.  A study by Wachter, 
Russo and Hershaff in 2006 indicated that subprime housing lenders tend to 
operate in low income, high percentage minority areas where people will be in need 
of small, high risk, high interest loans.2  If the same principle is applied to the 
prevalence of consumer lending establishments, then the number of establishments 
may be affected by the demographics and availability of customers.  For example, an 
increase in establishments may merely reflect an increase in the minority 
population per capita.   
The presence and prevalence of consumer lending establishments will be 
affected by both the legality of high interest loans and a demand within that state for 
consumer loans.  Small differences in state laws and regulations can be studied for 
their impact on the availability of small, high risk loans and the effects they 
ultimately have on the financial well-being of citizens.  Because the states serve as a 
                                                        
2 Wachter, S. M., Russo, K., & Hershaff, J. (2006, July 26). Subprime Lending: 
Neighborhood Patterns Over Time in US Cities (Research Paper No. 06-19). 3. 
 
4 
 
point of comparison for the effects of consumer lending establishments, it is 
important to choose states that have similar socio-economic indicators.   For these 
reasons Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida were 
chosen.  These six states have a generally conservative, pro-lending legal approach 
toward consumer lending, but there are small variations, such as how each state 
defines maximum interest rates.  These states also have similar demographics and 
consumer financial characteristics. 
There are two limitations of the data that are noteworthy.  The first is the 
size of individual establishments.  Because this study treats each establishment the 
same, it does not take into account the fact that one consumer lending establishment 
may give out many more loans than another establishment and therefore have a 
greater proportional effect on the state or county.  The Census Bureau’s County 
Business Patterns separates the number of establishments in each county and state 
into categories based on the number of employees, and the vast majority of those 
establishments fall into the lowest category (less than twenty employees).  This 
study does not distinguish between establishments of different size. 
The second limitation of note is the NAICS definition of consumer lending 
establishments.  This definition is quite broad, so the data do not identify how many 
of the loans given by consumer lending establishments are indeed small, high risk 
loans.  However, consumer lending establishments are defined as engaged in 
making unsecured cash loans to consumers, and such loans are nearly always small 
and high risk, so this study assumes that the unsecured cash loans in the data are in 
fact high risk.  This is plausible because, at the very least, a high percentage of the 
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consumer lending establishments do indeed give out small high risk loans to 
consumers with little or no credit score. 
 The importance of this study for consumers is clear.  High interest consumer 
lending could have a negative or positive effect on consumers.  While some might 
benefit from access to credit that they may not have otherwise, if more people are 
further in debt or more likely to be in poverty after taking out these loans, then 
there is a negative net effect on the regions’ economy.  On the other hand, if 
borrowers are able to meet financial obligations that they otherwise wouldn’t, such 
as repairing their car or keeping up with their bills, and they can repay the loan on 
time, then there is a positive net effect on the region’s economy.  Although the 
results are far from conclusive, they indicate that some states might be doing their 
consumers a service by “squeezing out” consumer lending via tight interest rate 
regulation, but in other states they might be preventing a beneficial service from 
being offered.  It is the responsibility of lawmakers and regulators to ensure that the 
system of credit always offers a positive net effect on the economy.   
 Section II summarizes a series of studies that motivated this study and offers 
context for the methodology of the study.  Section III provides an overview of the six 
selected states’ maximum interest rates and explains each state’s relative openness 
toward high interest credit.  Section IV explains the data and how they are analyzed.  
Section V presents the regression results, and Section VI provides some concluding 
remarks on what can be learned from this study.
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II. Review of Other Studies 
 The debt purchasing industry has received considerable attention in 
recent years.  Government agencies, such as the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have done in-depth studies 
into the process of debt buying and the potential harms it could bring to consumers.  
In 2009, the GAO reported on the growing credit card debt buying industry.  Credit 
card debt has been growing for years and much of this debt is sold to debt buyers 
who engage in collecting the debt on behalf of the originating creditor.  Consumer 
protection laws, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, apply to “…third-
party debt collectors, a term that includes collection agencies that operate on a 
contingency basis, collection law firms, and debt buyers, but generally does not 
apply to original creditors collecting on their own debt.”3  The primary focus of the 
government agency reports, like the GAO report, has been the fair and equitable 
collection of delinquent debt, as opposed to the structure of originating credit.  
Consequently, an unanswered question is, why are delinquency rates rising to begin 
with?  A part of the answer to this question could lie in the economic impact of high 
interest lending.   
                                                        
3 Cackley, A. P. (2009, September 21). CREDIT CARDS: Fair Debt Collection Practice 
Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace and Use of 
Technology (United States Government Accountability Office). 8.  
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In 2013, the FTC released a debt buying report that highlighted several flaws 
in the debt buying industry.  The FTC was particularly concerned with the lack of 
information and supporting documents that are transmitted to the debt purchaser.  
Without proper information as to the principal balance, interest rate, time spent in 
default, etc., the debt purchaser could attempt to collect an incorrect amount from 
the debtor.  Without supporting documents, the debtor will not be able to dispute 
the validity of the debt purchaser’s claims.  The FTC examined over 5,000,000 
accounts that were sold to debt purchasers.  Only 11% of accounts stated the 
principal balance to the debtor, and only 37% listed finance charges and fees.4  This 
study and numerous others by the FTC focus on flaws in the debt collection industry.  
If more attention is placed on the underlying credit instruments that lead to these 
defaults, then these problems could have a far smaller impact on the overall 
economic well-being of consumers.  
In 2013, Robert J. Hobbs testified before the Nevada Legislature in support of 
the Nevada Wage Protection Act.  In it, he discusses protecting consumers in 
financial emergencies, such as when they cannot repay a loan or have to file for 
bankruptcy.  He believes that items such as wages, household equity, tools, and 
pensions must be protected so that consumers can continue to meet their financial 
obligations while repaying delinquent debt.  He summarizes the different levels of 
protection states provide for consumers’ wages, homes, household goods, cars, tools, 
bank accounts and pensions, and he assigns a grade for each state in each category.  
                                                        
4 Leibowitz, J., Ramirez, E., Brill, J., Ohlhausen, M. K., & Wright, J. D. (2013, January). 
The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry (Federal Trade Commission). 
35.  
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He then notes that good wage protection grades often coincide with low numbers of 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings, suggesting that good wage protection puts more 
money in debtors’ pockets, which enables them to meet financial obligations, and 
avoid bankruptcy.  He advocates a 10% garnishment cap for funds taken from 
debtor’s paychecks when they are sued for delinquent debt.5  His study raises two 
key points.  One is how state lending and consumer laws can affect the financial 
stability of consumers.  For example, maximum interest rate laws can enable more 
consumer lending establishments to operate, thereby affecting consumer financial 
indicators.  The second is how consumer well-being can be measured by indictors 
such as Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings.  Both of these points are incorporated into this 
study. 
 Wachter et al. (2009) studies subprime lending patterns, particularly those of 
mortgages in low-income neighborhoods.  Consumer loans and subprime mortgages 
are likely to have similar characteristics as both are forms of high-risk credit.  The 
study notes, “… high subprime default rates are more likely to have adverse 
consequences for communities to the extent that subprime loans are concentrated 
in neighborhoods that are fundamentally more vulnerable to economic decline.”6  
This is an important factor to consider when determining the control variables for 
the study.  As stated earlier, consumer lending establishments are likely to appear in 
communities where demand for high risk credit is high, communities similar to the 
                                                        
5 Testimony of Robert J. Hobbs, National Consumer Law Center in Support of SB 373 
Nevada Wage Protection Act. (2013, March 26).  
6 Wachter, S. M., Russo, K., & Hershaff, J. (2006, July 26). Subprime Lending: 
Neighborhood Patterns Over Time in US Cities (Research Paper No. 06-19). 3. 
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ones described in Wachter et al.’s report.  They study areas with high minority 
populations and little college education, and they discover that these areas are often 
more likely to utilize subprime credit.  They conjecture that some subprime lenders 
may be “targeting” these demographics through extensive marketing of subprime 
products.  Thus, demographic factors are important to consider when isolating the 
affects of consumer lending establishments.  As a result, this study includes the 
percentage of a population that is white and the percentage of a population that has 
received some college education or higher as control variables in the regression 
analysis.  These variables will help explain the variation in the financial indicators, 
so that the effect of the establishments can be isolated. 
 Debt collection is clearly an area of concern for many regulatory agencies.  
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has sparked an interest to see all debt 
collected upon in a fair and equitable manner.  However, the underlying forms that 
credit take and the impact high risk credit can have on a consumer’s financial well-
being is an area of concern that seems to go unnoticed.  Some of the previous 
research has concluded that law plays an important role in the well-being of 
consumers, and that conclusion is reflected in this paper.   
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III. Legal Review of States’ Consumer Lending Laws 
 In states where lenders can give out loans for higher interest rates, the lender 
is able to charge high interest for loans given to customers that are considered less 
credit worthy.  This means that more consumers are expected to default on their 
loans, but the higher interest paid is expected to make up for those loses, so that 
these loans are as profitable as any other loan given by that lender.  As discussed in 
Section I, consumer lending often specializes in these high interest loans.  Therefore, 
in states where higher interest rates are permitted, one expects there to be more 
consumer lending establishments.  Further, one expects that where higher interest 
rates are permitted for small loans, there will be more consumer lending 
establishments per capita and thus greater effects on consumer well-being.  A 
review of state’s usury laws, e.g. maximum allowable interest rates and fees, can 
provide an indication of that state’s stance toward promoting or deterring various 
types of consumer lending. 
 Each state is responsible for classifying and regulating consumer lending as 
each sees fit, so across states there is a great deal of variance as to how loans are 
regulated as well as what types of fees are permitted.  However, some common 
elements appearing in most state statutes are: the maximum interest rate (also 
referred to as finance charges), maximum maintenance fees, and limits on closing 
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fees and any other permissible non-interest fees.  Most states permit relatively small 
non-interest fees, but the scope of the application of the maximum interest rate 
varies considerably.  For example, two states may have the same interest rate, but 
one state may allow for that rate to be applied to a larger loan than the other, 
enabling lenders to collect more interest.  While the NAICS definition of consumer 
lending does not specify as to the size of consumer loans, the six states studied here 
have usury laws for specific loan sizes that can range from as low as $100 to as high 
as over $7,000.  Given such variation in usury laws across these states, a brief 
summary of the statutes for each state is provided in this section.  
The Mississippi Small Loan Regulatory Law and Small Loan Privilege Tax 
Law went into effect March 30, 2006.  It created MS Code 75-17-21 which states that 
for any small loan to be paid back in monthly installments, the following finance 
charges shall apply:  for loans not exceeding $1,000 interest shall not to exceed 36% 
per annum, for loans greater than $1,000 and not exceeding $2,500 interest shall 
not exceed 33% per annum, for loans greater than $2,500 and not exceeding $5,000 
interest shall not exceed 24% per annum, and for loans exceeding $5,000 interest 
shall not exceed 14% per annum.  Closing fees for loans not exceeding $10,000 shall 
be $25.00 or 4% of the payments due (whichever is greater), and for loans greater 
than $10,000, closing fees shall be no greater than $500.7  Relative to the other five 
states studied, Mississippi allows for moderately high finance charges. 
The Louisiana Consumer Credit Law went into effect on January 1, 1973.  It 
created LA Rev Stat § 9:3510, which states that all consumer loans are subject to its 
                                                        
7 Small Loan Regulatory Law and Small Loan Privilege Tax Law, Miss. Code Ann. § 
75-17-21 
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restrictions, excluding credit cards, credit service charges and loans made by credit 
unions.  Maximum finance charges, as stated in 9:3519, are as follows: for loans no 
greater than $1,400 interest shall not exceed 36% per annum, for loans greater than 
$1,400 and less than $4,000 interest shall not exceed 27% per annum, for loans 
exceeding $4,000 and not exceeding $7,000 interest shall not exceed 24% per 
annum, and for loans exceeding $7,000 interest shall not exceed 21% per annum. 8 
One year after the maturity of a contract, interest cannot exceed 18% per annum.9  
Relative to Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia and Florida, Louisiana has the 
highest interest rate limits, but it does provide for a maximum interest rate of 18% 
after one year of maturity.  As this “after one year” feature is unique to Louisiana, it 
is not included when making relative comparisons across the six states. 
The Alabama Consumer Credit Act (“Mini Code”) took effect in 1971.  It 
created ALA CODE 5-19, which governs all consumer loans under $2,000.  The 
maximum finance charges are as follows: 15% interest may be charged on the 
unpaid portion of the loan under $750 and 10% interest may be charged on the 
unpaid portion of the loan greater than $750 and less than $2,000.10  The Alabama 
Small Loan Act took effect in 1959.  It governs loans under $1,000.  Maximum 
finance charges are as follows: 36% per annum on the unpaid balance up to $200 
and 24% per annum on the unpaid balance greater than $200 and less than $1,000.  
The Small Loan Act also provides for a $3.00 per month maintenance fee and a 
                                                        
8 Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, LSA-R.S. § 9:3519. 
9 Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, LSA-R.S. § 9:3522 
10 The Alabama Consumer Credit Act “Mini Code,” Ala.Code 1975 § 5-19-3 
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default charge of $18 or 5% of the amount due, whichever is greater.11  There does 
not appear to be any state limit for loans greater than $2,000.  Alabama differs from 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee and Georgia in that the Mini Code and Small Loan 
Act permit different interest rates to be applied to different portions of the same 
loan.  For example, on a $1,000 loan, the maximum allowable interest rate is 
relatively low in Alabama (36% on the first $200 and 24% on the remaining $800), 
whereas Mississippi and Louisiana allow 36% interest on the entire $1,000 loan.  
For a loan amount greater than $1,000 and not exceeding $2,000, the interest rate 
maximums are around 10% - 15% in Alabama, whereas interest rate maximums are 
between 24% and 36% in Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, or Florida.  Only 
Georgia has a lower rate (10%) for such a loan. 
Tennessee restricts the finance charges for all loans not defined by other 
Tennessee law to 10%.  Most consumer lending establishments fall under the 
definition of thrift companies and are regulated by the Industrial Loan and Thrift 
Companies chapter of the Tennessee statutes for Banks and Financial Institutions.  
These laws took effect on October 1, 2007.  According to § 45-5-401, the maximum 
effective interest rate for loans less than $100 shall not exceed 18% and the 
maximum effective interest rate for loans greater than or equal to $100 shall not 
exceed 24%.12  Lenders may also charge a service charge equal to 4% of the 
principal amount of the loan.13  Tennessee allows for a mid-level small loan interest 
rate (24%) to be charged on any loan over $100.  While Mississippi, Louisiana and 
                                                        
11 Alabama Small Loan Act, Ala.Code 1975 § 5-18-15 
12 T. C. A. § 45-5-401 
13 T. C. A. § 45-5-403 
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Florida permit higher rates for loans under $100, they also specify lower rates for 
larger loans, so for the range of consumer loans considered in this study, Tennessee 
allows moderately high interest rates for a typical consumer loan. 
The Georgia Small Industrial Loan Act provides an interest rate limit for all 
loans under $3,000.  The maximum interest rate to be contracted for and received is 
10% per annum.  Interest may be compounded only on loans with a maturity 
exceeding 18 months.  A loan fee may be charged but must be no greater than 8% of 
the first $600 plus 4% of the excess.   A late charge is permitted but cannot exceed 
the greater of $10 or 5% of the amount due.  A maintenance charge is permitted in 
the amount of $3.00 per month of the loan.14  There does not appear to be any state 
limit for loans greater than $3,000.  Although it allows for relatively high additional 
fees, Georgia allows for relatively low total interest compared to the other six states. 
Florida code 516.031 provides for interest rate limits for consumer finance 
companies, which are defined as loans not exceeding $25,000 and charging interest 
greater than 18%.  For loans made between October 1, 2006 and June 30, 2013 the 
maximum finance charges are as follows: 30% interest on the amount up to $2,000, 
24% interest on the amount greater than $2,000 and not exceeding $3,000, 18% 
interest on the amount greater than $3,000 and not exceeding $25,000.15  For loans 
entered into after June 30, 2013, the following finance charges are allowed: 30% 
interest on the amount up to $3,000, 24% interest on the amount greater than 
$3,000 and not exceeding $4,000, 18% interest on the amount greater than $4,000 
                                                        
14 The Georgia Small Industrial Loan Act, Ga. Code Ann., § 7-3-14 
15  F.S.A. § 516.031 (effective October 1, 2006 to June 30, 2013) 
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and not exceeding $25,000.16  Florida is similar to Alabama in that it allows different 
interest rates to be applied to different parts of a single loan.  For loans entered into 
after June 30, 2013, the amount of the loan that each maximum interest rate applies 
to has risen, which is beneficial to consumer lending establishments.   Although 
Florida does not allow for the 36% interest that Mississippi, Louisiana and (in some 
situations) Alabama allow, it does allow for fairly high finance charges, ones 
comparable to Mississippi and Louisiana.   Florida seems to allow for the third 
highest interest rates, just below Louisiana and Mississippi. 
 Figure 1 shows the maximum allowable interest rate for each state by the 
size of the loan.  Alabama and Florida allow each interest rate maximum to be 
applied to that respective portion of the loan, so one loan can have multiple 
maximum rates.  The figure shows that Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida permit 
relatively high rates, so they are expected to attract a relatively high number of 
establishments per capita, and their maximum rates decrease steadily as the loan 
increases in size.  Tennessee allows for moderately high interest for most loans, but 
it also allows for the highest interest for loans greater than $7,000.  Thus, like 
Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida, Tennessee’s lending environment can promote a 
fairly high number of consumer lending establishments.  Alabama has relatively low 
rates from loans between $1,000 and $2,000 but relatively high rates for loans less 
than $1,000. Georgia has relatively low maximum interest rates for loans less than 
$3,000.  Neither Alabama nor Georgia have a known interest rate limit for loans 
above $2,000 and $3,000, respectively, so they could still have pro-lending 
                                                        
16 F.S.A. § 516.031 (effective July 1, 2013) 
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environments for consumer lending if there is a demand for loans greater than those 
amounts.  The tighter regulations in Alabama and Georgia could make it difficult for 
consumer lending establishments to be successful if their smaller loans cannot 
charge the high interest rates that are permitted in other states. 
 
Figure 1. Maximum Allowable Interest Rates per State by Loan Size 
 
 Table 1 shows a category for each state’s maximum interest rate as well as 
the expected frequency of consumer lending establishments per capita.  Due to the 
complex structure of maximum interest rates, the high, medium, and low 
categorizations are relative comparisons based on the average interest rate 
presented in Figure 1.  Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida have high maximum 
interest rates.  Thus, they are expected to have a high frequency of consumer 
lending establishments per capita.  Tennessee permits relatively low interest rates 
for the smallest of consumer loans but relatively high interest rates for larger 
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consumer loans.  Therefore, Tennessee permits medium maximum interest rates 
and is expected to have a medium frequency of consumer lending establishments 
per capita.  Alabama and Georgia have low maximum interest rates for the small 
consumers but no interest rate maximum for larger consumer loans.  Consumer 
lending establishments in these states are expected to engage in lending outside 
these limits (loans greater than $2,000 in Alabama and loans greater than $3,000 in 
Georgia), resulting in a medium frequency of establishments.  Section IV will 
compare these expected frequencies to observed frequencies. 
Table 1.  Categories for Each State’s Maximum Interest Rate and Expected 
Frequency of Consumer Lending Establishments per Capita. 
State 
Maximum 
Interest 
Rate(s) 
Expected Frequency 
of Consumer 
Lending 
Establishments per 
Capita Comment 
Mississippi High High   
Louisiana High High   
Alabama Low Medium 
No maximum interest 
rate on loans greater 
than $2,000.  Different 
interest rate maximums 
are applied to different 
portions of the loan. 
Tennessee Medium Medium   
Georgia Low Medium 
No maximum interest 
rate on loans greater 
than $3,000. 
Florida High High   
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IV. Data 
IV.1. Sources 
 
Consumer lending establishments per capita is the primary independent 
variable because it represents the availability of consumer lending while taking into 
account population differences across states and counties.  Control variables include 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (for state level data only), the percent of 
population that identifies as white, the percent of population that has some college 
education or higher, and the unemployment rate.  Changes in GDP and changes in 
the unemployment rate indicate economic growth or decline.  In the state-level 
analysis GDP is used, and in the county-level analysis unemployment is used (GDP 
data are not available at the county level).  Changes in percent white or percent 
college education or higher reflect changing proportions of a population that may 
affect the use of consumer lending. 
The numbers of consumer lending establishments are acquired from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns.  The County Business Patterns provides 
data for the number of establishments for every six-digit NAICS code.  Data are 
available at the county, state and national level.  Data are also available on the 
number of establishments by employee size.17  Population estimates are taken from 
                                                        
17 United States Census Bureau. County Business Patterns. 
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the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Estimates of the Resident Population, a tool within 
the American Fact Finder.  Population estimates are available for every state and 
county for the year 2013.18   These estimates are used to calculate all per capita 
values, such as consumer lending establishments per capita and Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings per capita. 
GDP per capita is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis - Regional 
Data – GDP & Personal Income.19  The U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community 
Survey provides estimates for the percentage of a population that is white and the 
percentage of a population that has some college education or higher.20  These are 
both one year estimates provided for both counties and states.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics provides state and county level 
unemployment numbers.21 
Mean wages (for state level data), median household income (for county level 
data), poverty rates, and bankruptcy filings per capita (for state level data only) are 
used as measures of financial well-being.  Changes in wages and income reflect a 
population’s ability or inability to maintain a steady income, something that might 
not be possible if critical financial obligations are not might via the use of consumer 
lending.  Changes in the poverty rate indicates a population’s increasing or 
decreasing total wealth.  For example, a decrease in poverty could reflect a decrease 
                                                        
18U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013. (2014, March).   
19 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP & Personal 
Income, Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, Per capita real GDP.   
20U.S. Census Bureau.  2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 
B02001 Race, Universe: Total Population.   
21 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics.  
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in income or an increase in household size that is not accompanied by an increase in 
income.  If consumer lending helps individuals meet basic financial needs, then 
poverty rates should improve where consumer lending availability increases.   
Mean wages for each state are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Occupational Employment Statistics.22   Median household income is taken for every 
county of the six states.  County income data, county poverty data, and state poverty 
data come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates.23  The poverty rate measures the percentage of people in that county or 
state whose income in the past twelve months was below the poverty line.  The U.S. 
Census Bureau’s survey data, population estimates and administrative records 
produce these estimates.   
The best measure of bankruptcy is the portion of the population that has filed 
for Chapter 7 protection.  Chapter 7 is a liquidation option that involves the 
consumer liquidating his or her assets that are not determined to be exempt by the 
state24 and then using those proceeds to pay off remaining debts.  After that, any 
remaining balance is forgiven, and the consumer gets a fresh start with no 
outstanding debts.  Chapter 7 is utilized when one is in deep financial distress.  The 
number of filings in each state is reported by the United States Courts – Caseload 
Statistics Data Tables.25  
                                                        
22 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Occupational 
Employment Statistics.  
23 U.S. Census Bureau. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.  
24 see Hobbs testimony, pages 7-8 
25 United States Courts.  Caseload Statistics Data Tables.  
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Table 2 gives the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation for every independent and dependent variable using county level data for 
the six selected states over the years 2009-2013.  Table 2 does not include 
bankruptcy rates because they are not available at the county level.  For most of the 
variables and most of the states, there is little difference between the variable’s 
mean and median values in the given state.  (In symmetrical distributions, the mean 
and median are equal.)  The most skewed data set appears to be percent white in 
Alabama, where the mean is 68.31% and the median is 73.02%.  Alabama also has 
the largest standard deviation among states for percent white, with 21.52%.  
Interestingly, Tennessee has the largest mean and median for percent white and the 
lowest mean for percent of population with some college education or higher. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, 2009-2013. 
Independent 
Variables   Alabama Florida Georgia Louisiana Mississippi Tennessee 
Establishments 
Mean 1.19 0.18 1.40 2.08 1.74 1.19 
Median 1.06 0.13 1.23 2.17 1.72 1.16 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 4.44 1.43 8.45 5.91 4.74 4.45 
Standard 
Deviation 0.88 0.22 1.11 1.25 1.12 0.90 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Mean 10.92% 9.47% 10.67% 8.38% 11.09% 10.48% 
Median 10.20% 9.50% 10.40% 7.95% 10.70% 10.30% 
Minimum 4.70% 4.80% 5.60% 4.60% 5.30% 4.90% 
Maximum 26.30% 14.70% 22.90% 20.30% 20.20% 23.10% 
Standard 
Deviation 3.46% 1.96% 2.20% 2.36% 2.76% 2.37% 
Some College 
Education or 
Higher 
Mean 42.26% 48.26% 41.36% 39.06% 43.53% 38.46% 
Median 39.30% 48.50% 38.50% 36.10% 41.75% 36.60% 
Minimum 26.80% 25.10% 19.60% 24.80% 20.20% 18.10% 
Maximum 70.00% 72.20% 73.00% 62.50% 72.80% 77.40% 
Standard 
Deviation 8.66% 11.27% 11.20% 8.67% 8.71% 10.03% 
Percent White 
Mean 68.31% 79.59% 66.88% 64.77% 56.71% 89.48% 
Median 73.02% 82.38% 66.89% 66.80% 59.61% 93.53% 
Minimum 15.07% 36.75% 14.32% 26.04% 13.24% 40.95% 
Maximum 97.29% 93.43% 98.07% 98.00% 94.87% 99.29% 
Standard 
Deviation 21.52% 10.03% 17.26% 13.87% 20.02% 11.01% 
Dependent 
Variables               
Median Income 
Mean $36,739.20 $41,927.44 $39,421.55 $39,592.41 $33,744.51 $38,558.32 
Median $35,646.00 $41,072.00 $36,318.00 $38,377.50 $32,806.00 $36,858.00 
Minimum $20,990.00 $29,482.00 $23,887.00 $23,186.00 $21,617.00 $23,901.00 
Maximum $68,718.00 $66,312.00 $87,565.00 $70,303.00 $64,657.00 $93,241.00 
Standard 
Deviation $7,886.29 $7,187.36 $10,745.44 $8,266.55 $6,998.19 $8,432.68 
Percent in 
Poverty 
Mean 21.92% 19.04% 22.47% 21.61% 26.02% 19.80% 
Median 20.70% 18.50% 22.50% 21.00% 24.45% 19.50% 
Minimum 6.90% 8.70% 5.50% 9.20% 9.00% 5.40% 
Maximum 39.90% 33.90% 48.10% 45.80% 48.40% 44.80% 
Standard 
Deviation 6.25% 5.36% 6.94% 6.26% 7.52% 4.96% 
Observations   67 67 159 64 82 95 
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IV.2. Trends in Consumer Lending Establishments 
As of 2013, the average state in the U.S. has .43 consumer lending 
establishments per 10,000 people.  Consumer lending establishments more heavily 
populate Southern states per capita than any other geographic area in the United 
States.  The six states in this study have among the highest consumer lending 
establishment per capita figures in the country with the exception of Florida, which 
has a below average number of establishments per capita (.161). 
IV.2.a. National Level Summary  
 
A look into which states have higher concentrations of consumer lending 
establishments alongside state GDP offers economic context for the analysis of this 
study.  Figure 2 groups each of the fifty states into one of six geographic regions and 
plots each state according to consumer lending establishments per capita and state 
GDP per capita in 2013 (states within the same geographic region are plotted with 
the same symbol).  In addition, nine states are explicitly identified on the figure: the 
six studied states (MS, LA, AL, GA, TN, and FL) as well as Massachusetts (MA), 
Connecticut (CN), and Arkansas (AR).  Figure 2 shows that states in the Southeast 
have among the highest concentrations of consumer lending establishments and 
that their GDP per capita is around the middle to lower level of the United States.  
Arkansas is unique amongst Southern states, as it explicitly prohibits nearly all 
consumer lending establishments.  Northeast and New England states have much 
lower concentrations of consumer lending establishments, and their GDPs sit among 
the middle to upper levels in the country.  In particular, Massachusetts and 
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Connecticut are in stark contrast to the six Southern states studied here.  Figure 2 
provides an illustration of the correlation between high concentrations of consumer 
lending establishments and lower financial indicators.  Some Southwest states, 
particularly Oklahoma and New Mexico, are scattered among the Southeastern 
states with high levels of consumer lending establishments, and they might be 
worthy of future study. 
 
Figure 2.  Consumer Lending Establishments per capita and GDP per Capita by 
Region.  
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IV.2.b. State Level Summary 
 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia and Florida were 
identified as research candidates due to their trends in consumer lending 
establishments.  Figure 3 shows the six selected states’ consumer lending 
establishments per capita alongside the data for Arkansas, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts.  These nine states were highlighted in Figure 2 above. 
Figure 3 indicates that Mississippi and Louisiana have the highest levels of 
consumer lending establishments per capita, but their numbers have decreased 
somewhat since 2007.  Table 3 shows the maximum interest rate categories, 
expected frequency of establishments, and observed frequency of establishments.  
Table 3 shows that the relatively high levels in theses two states is consistent with 
the High expected frequency based on state laws.  Florida also has a High expected 
frequency based on its state laws, but it the lowest observed frequency of the six 
Southern states. It has around one-fifth as many establishments per capita as 
Mississippi and Louisiana, and its numbers have been decreasing at a more rapid 
rate since 2007.  In fact, Florida’s numbers have declined almost to the levels of 
Connecticut and Maine.26  Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia have around one half the 
establishments that Mississippi and Louisiana have, but considerably more than 
Florida and Arkansas.  The “middle of the pack” numbers for these three states is 
consistent with the Medium expected frequency based on their state laws.  The 
Tennessee and Alabama numbers have remained relatively stable or increased 
                                                        
26 In addition to the relatively high per capita GPD (Figure 2 above), Connecticut and 
Massachusetts have relatively low maximum interest rates compared to Southern 
states.  They would receive a Low expected frequency if included in Table 2 above.   
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slightly since 2007, while Georgia has decreased slightly.  The diversity in 
establishments per capita across the six selected Southern states provides the basis 
for the regression analysis below. 
 
Figure 3. Consumer Lending Establishments per capita 
 
Table 3. Categories for Each State’s Maximum Interest Rate, Expected 
Frequency of Consumer Lending Establishments per Capita, and Observed 
Frequency 
State 
Maximum 
Interest 
Rate(s) 
Expected Frequency 
of Consumer 
Lending 
Establishments per 
Capita 
Observed Frequency of 
Consumer Lending 
Establishments per 
Capita 
Mississippi High High High 
Louisiana High High High 
Alabama Low Medium Medium 
Tennessee Medium Medium Medium 
Georgia Low Medium Medium 
Florida High High Low 
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V. Regression Results 
This section presents regression results relating changes in measures of 
consumers’ financial well-being to changes in the number of consumer lending 
establishments.  The regressions also include control variables for ethnicity, 
education and general economic conditions.  The data period is 2007-2013 for state 
level regressions and 2009-2013 for county level regressions.  To highlight 
differences across years, separate regressions are run for the one-year periods 
beginning with 2007-2008 (or 2009-2010 for county level regressions) and ending 
with 2012-2013.  The year-to-year regressions are motivated in part by the 
occurrence of the Great Recession, arguably an exceptional event that could affect 
year-to-year trends.  
V.1. State Level Results 
 
At the state level, the year-to-year change in consumer financial well-being 
(∆CFWB) is measured by three variables: the change in mean wages (∆Mean Wages), 
the change in the poverty rate (∆Poverty Rate), and the change in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings per capita (∆Chapter 7).   For each of these, the following 
regression is estimated using state-level data from all fifty U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia: 
 ∆CFWB = β0 + β1∆NumEstbl + β2∆Unempl + β3∆PctColl + β4∆PctWht + ε 
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The primary independent variable of interest is the change in number of 
establishments per capita (∆NumEstbl).  The three control variables are the change 
in the unemployment rate (∆Unempl), the change in percent of the population that 
has a college education or higher (∆PctColl), and the change in the percent of 
population that is white (∆PctWht). 
Table 4 shows the eighteen estimated regressions.  The three dependent 
variables (measures of changes in consumer financial well-being) are shown across 
the top and the independent variables are shown down the left-hand side.  For each 
dependent variable, there are six time periods.  The estimated coefficients are 
shown along with their p-values; summary R2 and F statistics are shown at the 
bottom of the table.  In the ∆Poverty Rate regression, the variable ∆NumEstbl is 
statistically significant for periods ’09-’10 and ’10-’11, which occur shortly after the 
Great Recession of 2008.  These are highlighted in green in the table.  The positive 
coefficient for ∆NumEstbl indicates that on average in these two periods, in states 
where establishments per capita dropped, the percentage of people in poverty 
dropped, and, likewise, in states where establishments per capita rose, the 
percentage of people in poverty rose.  Additional discussion of this relationship is 
provided below.   
Table 4 also shows a statistically significant correlation between ∆NumEstbl 
and ∆Chapter 7 in ’10-’11 and ’11-‘12.  (Also highlighted in green.)  The coefficients, 
of the two time periods have opposing signs, giving mixed results as to how 
consumer lending correlates with consumers’ likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.  
Further analysis of the data reveals that there was an average decrease of .02  
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Table 4. State Level Multiple Regression. 
  
Mean Wages 
’07-‘08 ’08-‘09 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita  703.742 -843.394  1,804.537  .401.487  -310.188  -192.201 
(p-value) (0.372) (0.747) (.272)  (0.797) (0.590) (0.781) 
Unemployment rate 
78.349  -46.993  10.992 156.472 105.355 39.911 
(0.348) (0.459) (.885)  (.070)  (.260)  (.552)  
Some college education or 
higher 
9958.245  -4,319.446 2,939.997 -5,135.07  -2500.03  1990.439 
(0.014) (.168)  (.321)  (.019)  (0.439) (0.430) 
Percent White 
 8150.238  10221.551 -7.840 -127.224 187.652 -113.561 
(0.160) (0.483) (.072)  (.238)  (.177)  (.061)  
n 51 
R^2  .182 .071  .160   .168 .109   .086 
F  2.560 .882  .084  2.320   1.408 1.087  
Significance F (.051) (.482) (.084) (,071) (.246) (.374) 
  
Percent in Poverty 
’07-‘08 ’08-‘09 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 1.169 3.000  4.283 5.421  -.590  1.590 
(p-value) (.164)  (.330)  (0.038) (.026)  (0.350) (0.106) 
Unemployment rate 
0.271 0.226 0.202 -0.164 -0.026 -0.038 
(.003)  (.004)  (.036)  (0.204) (.797)  (.685)  
Some college education or 
higher 
-0.737 6.429 1.570  -.679 -2.150 -7.865 
(.860)  (.081)  (.666)  (0.832) (.541)  (.030)  
Percent White 
-3.172 16.910 -0.004  .049 -0.095  .109 
(.602)  (.322)  (.427)  (0.762) (.530)  (0.194) 
n 51 
R^2 .190  .242  .199   .122 .050  .163  
F 2.70  3.668  2.863  1.610   .610  2.239 
Significance F (.042) (.011) (.034) (.188) (.658) (.079) 
  
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings per capita 
’07-‘08 ’08-‘09 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita  -.532 -2.065  .747 -1.966 0.635  -.354 
(p-value) (0.390) (.353)  (0.523) (0.082) (0.046) (0.473) 
Unemployment rate 
 .209 0.280 0.138 0.231 0.085 0.047 
(0.002) (.000)  (.015)  (.000)  (.095)  (.324)  
Some college education or 
higher 
-3.437 2.115 2.360 -0.552 -2.791 -0.313 
(.269)  (.421)  (.266)  (.715)  (.114)  (.861)  
Percent White 
9.230  -22.702 0.000 -0.021 0.373  .080 
(.045)  (0.070) (.932)  (.779)  (.000)  (0.065) 
n 51 
R^2 .302  .408   .136 .282  .458  .114  
F  4.987 7.919  1.818  4.515  9.720  1.487  
Significance F (.002) (.000) (.142) (.004) (.000) (.222) 
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establishments per capita in ’10-’11 and an average increase of .06 in ’11-’12, while 
bankruptcy rates decreased across all states during both time periods, with the sole 
exception of Delaware in ’10-‘11.  Consequently, the ∆NumEstbl coefficient estimate 
is negative in ’10-’11 and positive in ’11-’12. 
This relationship between the change in the poverty rate and the change in 
the number of consumer lending establishments is further illustrated in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 is a scatter plot of these two variables for all fifty-one data points during 
the ‘09-’10 period.  A polynomial trend line is included on the figure and it 
demonstrates that poverty rates increase when consumer lending establishments 
increase.  This supports the theory that consumer lending could have a net negative 
effect on the financial well-being of consumers.  North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Vermont are three major outliers.  All experienced a poverty percent decrease of 5%, 
highly unusual given the recession.  In North Dakota and South Dakota this can be 
attributed to the shale oil boom which brought billions of dollars into these states 
and drastically reduced unemployment.  In Vermont the percentage of the 
population with some college education or higher rose by 8.9%, by far the largest 
increase or decrease in the nation.  If these three outliers are removed, the strength 
of the relationship between change in establishments and change in poverty percent 
is greatly increased.  The R2 rises to .366.   
The findings of Wachter et al. suggest that consumer lending establishments 
may have decided to close in areas where a low income clientele was disappearing, 
perhaps because they were borrowing less after the Great Recession.  If so, areas 
that were hit hardest by the recession (resulting in less high interest borrowing), 
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there were more establishments leaving the area, and this correlates with a decline 
(or a slower increase) in the poverty rate.  This suggests that in areas where 
consumer lending was declining, the effects of the recession on consumers were 
partially mitigated. 
 
Figure 4. Change in Percentage of Population in Poverty and Change in 
Consumer Lending Establishments per Capita Scatter Plot. 
The state-level analysis implies that there could be some correlation between 
∆NumEstbl and ∆Poverty Rate from ’09-’10 and ’10-’11.  The positive coefficients 
imply that there is a net negative effect on financial well-being.  Although there were 
statistically significant p-values for ∆Chapter7 regressed on ∆NumEstbl from ’10-’11 
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and ’11-’12, the coefficients cast doubt into the certainty of any correlation because 
one was positive and one was negative. 
V.2.  County-Level Results. 
 
Multiple regressions similar to those in section V.1. were estimated for 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Tennessee using county-level 
data.  Two data related issues arose during the estimation.  The first was data 
availability.  Data are not available for percent of the population that has a college 
education or higher or the percent of population that is white before the year 2009. 
Also, bankruptcy data are not available at the county level.  Consequently, 
regressions are estimated for the four one-year periods ’09-’10 through ’12-‘13, and 
only two measures of the change in consumer well-being are used.  Lastly, mean 
wages are not available at the county level, so median household income is used 
instead. 
The second issue was a high occurrence of zeros in the change in the number 
of consumer lending establishments at the county level.  That is, many counties had 
no change in the number of establishments in some year-to-year periods.  For 
example, some counties only have one or two establishments, and the number of 
establishments changes infrequently, so they often have zero values for changes in 
consumer lending establishments per capita.  A high prevalence of zeros creates 
some statistical inference problems, the solutions to which are beyond the scope of 
this study (e.g., zero-inflated Poisson regression).   As a partial solution, the 
regressions were estimated using only those counties that had a non-zero change in 
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the number of establishments. The count and percentage of zero-change counties is 
provided at the bottom of each regression table.  
The regressions utilize two measures of the change in consumer well-being 
as the dependent variable: the change in median household income (∆Median 
Income) and the change in the poverty rate (∆Poverty Rate).  Again, the change in 
establishments per capita (∆NumEstbl) is the primary independent variable of 
interest.  There are three control variables: the change in the unemployment rate 
(∆Unempl), the change in percent of the population that has a college education or 
higher (∆PctColl), and the change in the percent of population that is white 
(∆PctWht).  
 The forty-eight regressions are reported in Table 5 (six states, two 
dependent variables, and four time periods).   The table is formatted similar to Table 
4, with dependent variables across the top, independent variables down the left side, 
summary statistics at the bottom, and statistically significant occurrences of 
∆NumEstbl highlighted in green.  One additional feature at the bottom of the table is 
the counts and percentages of times when ∆NumEstbl has value of zero.  As 
mentioned above, the high frequency of these can cause statistical problems, and the 
regressions were estimated using only those observations with nonzero values.  A 
regression results table of all regressions with zeros is included in the Appendix 
(Table A.1).  Table 5 shows that all six states have a high percentage of counties in 
which there are no changes in the number of establishments. 
 Changes in establishments per capita have very little correlation with median 
household income.  In five of the six states there is a mix of positive and negative 
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coefficients, and only two of the twenty-four ∆Median Income regressions have 
statistically significant ∆NumEstbl coefficients (positive in Alabama ’09-’10, negative 
in Florida ’10-’11).  Change in establishments has a statistically significant 
correlation to change in the poverty rate in at least one regression for every state 
except Georgia. However, in the ∆Poverty Rate regressions, these seven significant 
∆NumEstbl coefficients have a mix of positive and negative signs: negative in 
Alabama (’09-’10) and Mississippi (’09-’10 and ’12-’13), and positive in Florida (’09-
’10 and ’10-‘11), Louisiana (’12-’13), and Tennessee (’11-’12).   
A negative ∆NumEstbl coefficient in a ∆Poverty Rate regression indicates 
that consumer lending corresponds with a lower poverty rate, a positive effect on 
the economy.  This could occur if consumer lending provides an essential service to 
those in need of credit. Notably, the significant negative coefficients for Alabama and 
Mississippi occur in ‘09-’10, right after the recession.  Perhaps this is when 
consumer credit was needed most.  In areas where consumer lending was becoming 
less available, county populations might be more likely to see an increase in poverty 
rates.  A positive ∆NumEstbl coefficient in a ∆Poverty Rate regression indicates that 
consumer lending corresponds with higher poverty rates, a negative effect on the 
economy. There is some evidence that this occurred in Florida, Louisiana, and 
Tennessee.  In Figure 3 above, Florida has the fewest number of consumer lending 
establishments, and that number has been steadily falling since 2008. In ’09-’10 
and ’10-’11 there is evidence that in Florida counties where establishments 
decreased, the poverty rate decreased.  Interestingly, Florida has among the most 
generous laws for consumer lending.  Florida does not have the same high levels of 
35 
 
consumer lending establishments that are seen in other lending-friendly states like 
Mississippi and Louisiana.  The decrease in consumer lending seems to be to 
Florida’s advantage though with regard to the poverty rate.  Thirty out of thirty-four 
counties decreased from ’09-’10 (34 of 67 counties had change in establishments).  
Louisiana and Tennessee have similar patterns in numbers of establishments 
(Figure 3 above), and they also have usury laws that support consumer lending 
establishments.  In ’12-’13, Louisiana’s establishments dropped in 34 out of 37 
parishes, and in 21 of those 34 parishes, the poverty rate dropped.  In ’11-’12, 
Tennessee establishments increased in 54 out of 59 counties, and the poverty rate 
decreased in 30 of those 54 counties.  This supports the theory that consumer 
lending establishments are correlated with negative effects on consumer financial 
well-being. 
36 
 
Table 5. County-Level Multiple Regression 
 
                                                                                    Alabama 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
1941.510 -156.452 293.806 -205.019 -2.666 -0.758 -0.330 -0.285 
(.040) (.861) (.415) (.656) (.081) (.521) (.544) (.555) 
Unemployment rate 
184.071 -334.077 -581.100 221.319 0.239 0.539 0.670 -0.886 
(.565) (.572) (.108) (.745) (.649) (.489) (.219) (.220) 
Some college education or higher 
20,321.74 -20,599.29 -25,494.07 42,943.30 -11.553 78.782 -14.034 
-
147.977 
(.462) (.499 (.268) (.249) (.798) (.058) (.686) (.001) 
Percent white 
-12,802.663 16,341.23 -93,657.06 -96,505.85 64.612 -27.136 50.819 99.147 
(.726) (.888) (.261) (.270) (.289) (.859) (685) (.279) 
n 26 29 47 31 26 29 47 31 
R^2 0.247 0.048 0.091 0.120 0.253 0.230 0.042 0.410 
F 1.723 0.300 1.050 0.885 1.777 1.796 0.465 4.518 
Significance F (.183) (.875) (.393) (.487) (.171) (.163) (.761) (.007) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
41 38 20 36 41 38 20 36 
(61%) (57%) (30%) (54%) (61%) (57%) (30%) (54%) 
 
                                                                                    Florida 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
-1,803.897 -10,312.28 241.228 1,275.226 5.301 12.379 -2.964 -2.369 
(.589) (.020) (.919) (.825) (.045) (.023) (.190) (.564) 
Unemployment rate 
154.201 555.687 1,011.106 -2,091.239 -0.361 -0.412 -0.572 -0.143 
(.698) (.543) (.349) (.294) (.241) (.714) (.570) (.919) 
Some college education or higher 
20,690.33 96,463.97 63,974.08 -38,898.05 1.205 -158.633 -26.600 -39.480 
(.600) (.081) (.313) (.578) (.968) (.024) (.652) (.428) 
Percent white 
54,316.71 -35,342.20 59,285.34 -34,948.01 -83.894 40.545 4.545 -32.231 
(.224) (.617) (.481) (.782) (.018) (.642) (.954) (.720) 
n 34 23 28 27 34 23 28 27 
R^2 0.129 0.296 0.201 0.084 0.357 0.315 0.147 0.065 
F 1.078 1.892 0.650 0.507 4.034 2.070 0.994 0.380 
Significance F (.386) (.156) (.633) (.731) (.010) (.127) (.431) (.820) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
33 44 39 40 33 44 39 40 
(49%) (66%) (58%) (60%) (49%) (66%) (58%) (60%) 
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                                                                                    Georgia 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
-162.962 -767.581 -201.697 -49.626 -1.036 0.378 -0.613 -0.415 
(.883) (.214) (.511) (.906) (.167) (.763) (.895) (.412) 
Unemployment rate 
-1.078 -570.038 1,418.168 445.278 0.832 0.112 -0.963 -1.145 
(.998) (.268) (.001) (.455) (.021) (.915) (.060) (.114) 
Some college education or higher 
23,298.60 26,730.90 2,594.464 36,585.08 -13.652 -67.443 -49.130 -59.874 
(.444) (.277) (.868) (.106 (.501) (.183) (.012) (.030) 
Percent white 
13,639.35 70,945.14 18.512 54,359.50 -35.226 -19.981 -27.364 -55.716 
(.622) (.061) (.999) (.151) (.062) (.792) (.217) (.218) 
n 37 40 69 41 37 40 69 41 
R^2 0.033 0.172 0.177 0.128 0.353 0.053 0.178 0.219 
F 0.272 1.822 3.452 1.325 4.373 0.487 3.464 2.521 
Significance F (.894) (.147) (.013) (.279) (.006) (.745) (.013) (.058) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
122 119 90 118 122 119 90 118 
(77%) (75%) (57%) (74%) (77%) (75%) (57%) (74%) 
 
                                                                                    Louisiana 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
399.309 1,219.448 -603.943 566.231 0.373 1.897 0.154 2.292 
(.403) (.478) (.326) (.530) (.686) (.299) (.774) (.029) 
Unemployment rate 
-221.482 922.665 120.323 -821.473 -0.128 2.785 -2.149 -0.614 
(.260) (.449) (.902) (.173) (.735) (.038) (.019) (.361) 
Some college education or higher 
2,189.150 4,182.693 63,307.50 6,584.011 55.350 -24.462 -77.650 37.732 
(.919) (.889) (.085) (.801) (.188) (.442) (.019) (.204) 
Percent white 
15,106.25 -79,907.53 105,290.4 143,851.6 -81.830 188.065 -133.418 -11.997 
(.365) (.463) (.336) (.231) (.015) (.109) (.171) (.928) 
n 35 29 31 37 35 29 31 37 
R^2 0.141 0.051 0.250 0.090 0.204 0.235 0.357 0.162 
F 1.234 0.321 2.172 0.794 1.918 1.841 3.607 1.552 
Significance F .317) (.861) (.100) (.538) (.133) (.154) (.018) (.211) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
29 35 33 27 29 35 33 27 
(45%) (55%) (52%) (42%) (45%) (55%) (52%) (42%) 
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                                                                                     Mississippi 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
474.083 304.125 60.273 -4.953 -2.812 -0.596 -0.701 -1.668 
(.633) (.834) (.866) (.993) (.099) (.736) (.205) (.025) 
Unemployment rate 
-334.050 32.665 -1,148.860 212.623 -0.091 0.530 -1.211 1.305 
(.309) (.953) (.088) (.734) (.867) (.736) (.236) (.122) 
Some college education or higher 
3,493.148 -4,719.970 12,611.63 -21,092.26 -25.744 -50.190 -31.464 -18.038 
(.910) (.885) (.506) (.511) (.619) (.214) (.281) (.670) 
Percent white 
-23,802.67 -114,166.0 -48,883.47 -194,524.9 -91.045 297.917 -11.357 
-
131.625 
(.486) (.614) (.420) (.153) (.119) (.284) (.902) (.460) 
n 28 28 44 38 28 28 44 38 
R^2 0.070 0.015 0.104 0.064 0.195 0.209 0.106 0.210 
F 0.432 0.088 1.130 0.568 1.395 1.522 1.161 2.193 
Significance F (.784) (.985) (.356) (.688) (.267) (.229) (.343) (.091) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
54 54 38 44 54 54 38 44 
(66%) (66%) (46%) (54%) (66%) (66%) (46%) (54%) 
 
                                                                                     Tennessee 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
-17.802 2,001.620 -374.420 -553.727 0.035 -1.208 1.092 1.374 
(.985) (.140) (.536) (.579) (.973) (.345) (.043) (.197) 
Unemployment rate 
97.034 480.893 124.461 1,675.461 -0.193 -1.008 0.051 -0.036 
(.754) (.563) (.784) (.006) (.553) (.209) (.899) (.953) 
Some college education or higher 
30,462.47 -9,295.362 -16,405.02 52,933.51 15.505 -28.876 18.761 38.818 
(.460) (.828) (.538) (.147) (.720) (.481) (.423) (.311) 
Percent white 
40,398.76 -25,580.15 58,971.74 -64,684.57 -14.325 28.246 -31.409 -38.189 
(.569) (.860) (.504) (.368) (.847) (.838) (.684) (.615) 
n 37 36 59 39 37 36 59 39 
R^2 0.038 0.075 0.017 0.216 0.015 0.086 0.076 0.089 
F 0.316 0.629 0.236 2.339 0.119 0.726 1.110 0.831 
Significance F (.865) (.645) (.917) (.075) (.975) (.581) (.361) (.515) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
58 59 36 56 58 59 36 56 
(61%) (62%) (38%) (59%) (61%) (62%) (38%) (59%) 
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V.3 Limitations of the Study 
 This study used a 10% level of significance when indicating which p-values 
and coefficients were statistically significant.  A 10% level of significance is 
considered to be marginally significant.  Also, there were 48 different regressions 
performed for the county level data, and only 9 of those 48 showed a statistically 
significant p-value, using a 10% level of significance.  At this level of significance, it 
is possible that several of my statistically significant results occurred by chance.  
Therefore, there is no overall, strong evidence of a negative or positive correlation 
between consumer lending establishments and financial indicators.   
 The measures used in this study were also inexact.  True measures of 
financial well-being such as debt load per capita, default rates, etc. were unavailable 
for this study.  If such data could be found at the county level then this study might 
be worth repeating using different indicators of financial well-being.  Also, services 
such as check cashing and pay day loans are typically included in the NAICS 
definition of consumer lending, and these establishments have their own laws and 
regulations in some of the states studied.  A more complete legal review would have 
included these check cashing laws and payday lending laws, giving a more complete 
picture as to what effects state laws have on the frequency of consumer lending 
establishments.  Such laws might explain why Florida had the lowest frequency of 
consumer lending establishments despite have high maximum interest rates for 
small loans.  Perhaps payday lending and check cashing establishments make up a 
high proportion of consumer lending establishments, and entirely different laws 
regulate those establishments.
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VI. Conclusion 
 This study sought to discover whether the frequency of consumer lending 
establishments has any correlation with financial indicators.    The study used the 
number of establishments per capita, unemployment rate, percent white, and 
percent with some college education or higher as independent variables.  The 
dependent variables were my financial indicators, which included mean wages, 
median income, poverty rate, and bankruptcy filings per capita.  Several of these 
variables have been used in similar studies.   The maximum interest rates for small 
loans in each state were also studied, and higher maximum interest rates correlated 
with higher frequencies of consumer lending establishments, with the exception of 
Florida. 
 Median income and wages had very few statistically significant correlations.  
Only two (Alabama ’09-’10 and Florida ’10-’11) of twenty-four coefficients are 
statistically significant when regressing changes in county data on changes in 
median income.  The conclusion of this study is that either median income is a poor 
indicator of financial well-being when studying the effects of consumer lending 
establishments per capita, or consumer lending establishments per capita have very 
little affect on the median incomes of consumers.  Also, there are conflicting 
coefficient signs throughout the data, further supporting this conclusion. 
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Robert J. Hobbs argues that income is crucial to a consumer’s ability to repay debts 
in times of financial distress.  The data indicate that consumer lending 
establishments per capita have very little influence, good or bad, on consumers’ 
incomes.  Therefore, consumer lending establishments per capita have little 
correlation with the overall financial well being of consumers with regard to income. 
 Two (’10-’11 and ’11-’12) of the six regressions that included changes in 
percentage of a population that filed for bankruptcy are statistically significant, but 
their coefficients have opposing signs.  This regression was estimated using 
nationwide data.  Again, the results indicate that changes in bankruptcy rates are 
either a poor indicator of financial well being, or changes in bankruptcy rates are 
not affected by changes in consumer lending establishments per capita.  
Both the state-level and county-level regressions found some evidence of a 
relationship between change in the number of consumer lending establishments 
and change in the poverty rate.  Many of the statistical correlations occurred after 
the Great Recession.  Negative coefficients from the change in the number of 
consumer lending establishments and change in poverty rate regression could be 
the result of economic forces from the recession that forced consumer lending 
businesses to close and drive up poverty rates.   
 Table 6 replicates Table 3, but it also gives the relationship between change 
in the number of consumer lending establishments and change in the poverty rate 
for each state, including whether the coefficient(s) were positive or negative for 
each regression with a statistically significant p-value, and it includes the year in 
which the statistically significant p-value occurred to the right of the “Positive” or 
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“Negative” indicator.  Below that, in parentheses, is a tally of the positive/negative 
signs of all four coefficients for each state (whether or not it was statistically 
significant).  The states with negative coefficients (Alabama and Mississippi) have 
medium and high, respectively, expected frequencies and observed frequencies of 
consumer lending establishments per capita.  This suggests that consumer lending 
laws could have created a lending environment that was economically beneficial to 
consumers.  The statistically significant regressions in ’09-’10 in both states support 
this.  Although they were not all statistically significant, all coefficients in Alabama 
and Mississippi were negative. 
Table 6. Categories for Each State’s Maximum Interest Rate, Expected 
Frequency and Observed Frequency of Consumer Lending Establishments per 
Capita, and ∆Number of Establishments relation with ∆Poverty Rate 
 
 
State 
Maximum 
Interest 
Rate(s) 
Expected 
Frequency of 
Consumer 
Lending 
Establishments 
per Capita 
Observed 
Frequency of 
Consumer 
Lending 
Establishments 
per Capita 
∆Number of 
Establishments 
relation with 
∆Poverty Rate 
Mississippi High High High 
Negative 09-10, 12-13 
(4 –, 0 +) 
Louisiana High High High 
Positive 12-13 
(0 –, 4 +) 
Alabama Low Medium Medium 
Negative 09-10  
(4 –, 0 +)  
Tennessee Medium Medium Medium 
Positive 11-12 
(1 –, 3 +) 
Georgia Low Medium Medium 
None 
(3 –, 1 +) 
Florida High High  Low 
Positive 09-10, 10-11 
(2 –, 2 +) 
 
 The states with positive coefficients (Louisiana, Tennessee, and Florida) have 
high, medium, and low, respectively, observed frequency of consumer lending 
establishments per capita.  The fact that a positive correlation is supported by a 
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diversity of consumer lending establishment frequencies seems to strengthen the 
theory that higher frequencies of consumer lending establishments are correlated 
with negative effects on consumers. 
 Lawmakers and consumers should take notice that some states, such as 
Florida, might be benefitting from the number of consumer lending establishments 
per capita decreasing.  There are few statistically significant correlations, but states 
such as Louisiana and Tennessee might benefit from regulation that resulted in 
fewer consumer lending establishments per capita.  The constantly decreasing 
numbers of establishments in Florida indicate that decreases in establishments 
might not be linked to maximum interest rates because maximum interest rates in 
Florida are relatively high.  On the other hand, Mississippi and Alabama could be 
benefitting from the frequency of consumer lending establishments.  Consumer 
lending might provide borrowers with an essential line of credit that keeps 
consumers out of financial distress, especially in periods after the recession.
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Table A.1. Southern States Multiple Regression Results (including counties in 
which change in establishments per capita equals zero) 
 
                                                                                    Alabama 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
1714.146 -115.409 284.316 -304.961 -1.991 -0.674 -0.338 -0.024 
(.042) (.871) (.393) (.465) (.211) (.560) (.538) (.974) 
Unemployment rate 
94.707 -128.136 -450.943 419.623 -0.499 0.005 0.647 -1.343 
(.516) (.871) (.106) (.366) (.077) (.992) (.160) (.096) 
Some college education or higher 
11861.816 -8716.097 7886.764 14454.357 -64.41 41.825 -23.783 -52.286 
(.388) (.600) (.611) (.438) (.016) (.165) (.354) (.106) 
Percent white 
-28993.97 -13491.061 -58291.413 -10167.093 15.395 21.724 39.791 90.057 
(.051) (.433) (.380) (.832) (.581) (.483) (.716) (.277) 
n 67 
R^2 0.144 0.019 0.052 0.034 0.144 0.044 0.039 0.088 
F 0.043 0.3 0.842 0.541 2.612 0.707 0.624 1.5 
Significance F (.043) (.877) (.504) (.706) (.044) (.590) (.646) (.213) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
41 38 20 36 41 38 20 36 
61% 57% 30% 54% 61% 57% 30% 54% 
 
                                                                                    Florida 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
777.317 -5556.911 610.614 3426.344 3.559 6.866 -1.898 -1.608 
(.784) (.122) (.805) (.400) (.269) (.059) (.301) (.655) 
Unemployment rate 
341.262 -156.066 -791.556 -656.506 -0.541 1.111 -0.367 0.042 
(.174) (.759) (.272) (.418) (.058) (.033) (.489) (.954) 
Some college education or higher 
13837.772 14238.208 43982.659 30540.838 26.162 -30.177 -71.14 -25.846 
(.478) (.367) (.072) (.243) (.236) (.060) (.000) (.264) 
Percent white 
13894.632 -30644.331 29507.033 -69811.618 -31.581 14.904 -23.629 42.013 
(.475) (.088) (.107) (.138) (.153) (.405) (.081) (.310) 
n 67 
R^2 0.064 0.097 0.115 0.058 0.108 0.141 0.285 0.031 
F 1.068 1.661 2.022 0.961 1.867 2.555 6.191 0.502 
Significance F (.380) (.170) (.102) (.435) (.127) (.048) (.000) (.734) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
33 44 39 40 33 44 39 40 
49% 66% 58% 60% 49% 66% 58% 60% 
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                                                                                    Georgia 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
-230.162 -709.051 -248.528 230.309 -0.606 0.081 -0.025 -0.546 
(.788) (.266) (.369) (.599) (.578) (.930) (.951) (.358) 
Unemployment rate 
144.91 -406.703 1050.572 -101.626 -0.09 0.258 -0.425 -0.3 
(.275) (.048) (.000) (.704) (.593) (.385) (.253) (.409) 
Some college education or higher 
-4258.922 15106.577 8623.654 3478.609 -2.79 -15.779 -8.156 -1.798 
(.692) (.097) (.277) (.710) (.838) (.230) (.484) (.887) 
Percent white 
20269.101 9863.529 -910.152 -19099.731 -12.055 3.042 4.076 -8.664 
(.019) (.227) (.917) (.207) (.271) (.796) (.750) (.672) 
n 159 
 
      
R^2 0.041 0.066 0.114 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.012 
F 1.667 2.71 4.965 0.534 0.57 0.605 0.41 0.487 
Significance F (.160) (.032) (.001) (.711) (.685) (.660) (.801) (.745) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
122 119 90 118 122 119 90 118 
77% 75% 57% 74% 77% 75% 57% 74% 
 
                                                                                    Louisiana 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
650.047 580.706 -310.228 469.656 0.494 1.327 -0.591 1.618 
(.431) (.701) (.653) (.503) (.592) (.400) (.436) (.068) 
Unemployment rate 
135.761 -162.124 -197.137 -666.636 -0.536 1.711 0.19 0.244 
(.546) (.817) (.647) (.122) (.037) (.021) (.688) (.648) 
Some college education or higher 
16595.167 18575.387 17012.173 5823.324 29.775 -1.892 11.172 -11.034 
(.329) (.370) (.399) (.707) (.120) (.930) (.613) (.570) 
Percent white 
-16180.873 -23417.53 -8264.379 16055.396 -52.3 48.342 -107.131 35.431 
(.386) (.629) (.898) (.771) (.014) (.338) (.132) (.607) 
n 64 
 
      
R^2 0.038 0.016 0.022 0.044 0.156 0.109 0.059 0.071 
F 0.582 0.239 0.326 0.678 2.731 1.811 0.921 1.135 
Significance F (.677) (.915) (.859) (.610) (.037) (.139) (.458) (.349) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
29 35 33 27 29 35 33 27 
45% 55% 52% 42% 45% 55% 52% 42% 
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                                                                                     Mississippi 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
195.808 -774.667 91.72 54.86 -1.793 0.692 -0.647 -1.339 
(.817) (.350) (.787) (.908) (.251) (.627) (.222) (.094) 
Unemployment rate 
76.315 -18.816 -760.943 125.175 -0.171 -0.145 -0.727 0.787 
(.530) (.937) (.065) (.692) (.445) (.723) (.253) (.137) 
Some college education or higher 
-1110.3 4875.916 9106.446 -5404.198 13.494 -33.308 -31.146 -0.424 
(.915) (.696) (.425) (.720) (.479) (.124) (.081) (.987) 
Percent white 
7862.901 -334.816 -56805.305 -18104.885 -49.584 31.104 -22.418 12.53 
(.630) (.989) (.209) (.593) (.101) (.443) (.748) (.824) 
n 82 
R^2 0.008 0.013 0.086 0.012 0.062 0.043 0.074 0.069 
F 0.159 0.245 1.815 0.237 1.268 0.859 1.534 1.428 
Significance F (.958) (.912) (.134) (.917) (.290) (.492) (.201) (.232) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
54 54 38 44 54 54 38 44 
66% 66% 46% 54% 66% 66% 46% 54% 
 
                                                                                     Tennessee 
  
Median Income Percent in Poverty 
’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 ’09-‘10 ’10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ’12-‘13 
Establishments per capita 
-3.303 1834.48 225.105 -800.567 0.416 -1.006 0.272 1.572 
(.997) (.112) (.621) (.438) (.659) (.441) (.595) (.157) 
Unemployment rate 
138.471 117.748 129.924 1116.699 -0.057 -0.093 0.41 -0.475 
(.324) (.685) (.695) (.006) (.721) (.777) (.274) (.271) 
Some college education or higher 
-6551.046 7440.848 5577.982 22327.099 -36.96 2.894 -25.276 -0.823 
(.678) (.672) (.753) (.141) (.044) (.885) (.207) (.959) 
Percent white 
20116.272 -7266.47 -229.194 -15330.118 -10.903 -38.687 -5.452 -1.597 
(.301) (.804) (.993) (.758) (.625) (.248) (.854) (.976) 
n 95 
R^2 0.027 0.032 0.005 0.101 0.053 0.022 0.04 0.03 
F 0.613 0.74 0.124 2.523 1.266 0.501 0.943 0.704 
Significance F (.654) (.567) (.974) (.046) (.289) (.735) (.443) (.591) 
Number (percentage) of counties where change in 
establishments equals zero 
58 59 36 56 58 59 36 56 
61% 62% 38% 59% 61% 62% 38% 59% 
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